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However, Thompson's appeal challenges only the District

Court's Order granting Hurricane City's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) and (4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j), and Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Did the District Court correctly rule that under the

"public duty" doctrine, Hurricane City had no duty to control a
third party's escaped horse?
B.

Did the District Court correctly rule that no "special

relationship" existed between Hurricane City and Mr. Thompson?
The standard of appellate review for questions of law is
correctness.

Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. Garfield

County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991).
III.

LAW WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE

No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and/or regulations are determinative.

Rather, the common law

"public duty" doctrine is determinative.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case And Course Of Proceedings.

Mr. Thompson was injured when his motorcycle collided with a
stray horse.

The horse was owned by Defendant Smart, and was

corralled by Defendants Glenn. The accident occurred in a rural
area within the Hurricane City limits on State Highway SR-9.

1

Less than an hour before the accident, the Hurricane City Clerk
was notified that the horse was loose. Although some effort was
made to notify the local animal control officer, Hurricane City
made no effort to locate, and did not impound the horse prior to
the accident.
Mr. Thompson was a member of the general public.

Prior to

the accident, Hurricane City and Mr. Thompson had no contact with
the other concerning the horse.

Neither Mr. Thompson nor anyone

else took any action in reliance upon any City action or
representation regarding the horse's whereabouts or propensities.
Mr. Thompson had no knowledge of the stray horse prior to the
accident.

The City had no knowledge that Mr. Thompson would be

in the vicinity of the horse, or that the horse posed any
particular threat to Mr. Thompson.

The City had no basis to

distinguish Mr. Thompson from the public at large.
Mr. Thompson filed a negligence action against multiple
defendants, including Hurricane City.

Mr. Thompson claimed that

Hurricane City had a duty to enforce its animal control
ordinances and protect him from the conduct of third persons or
their animals.

Hurricane City moved for summary judgment on the

ground that it owed Mr. Thompson no duty of care.

The District

Court granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
ground that Hurricane City owed Mr. Thompson no duty of care.

2

Plaintiff Thompson's interlocutory appeal seeks review of that
Order.
B.

Statement Of Facts.

1.

On July 13, 1990, Barry Thompson was traveling on a

motorcycle westbound on State Highway 9 ("SR-9").

At

approximately 1700 West State Street in Hurricane City, a horse
owned by Defendant Smart was at large and grazing along the north
side of SR-9. R. at 2.
2.

The horse darted across SR-9 and collided with the

motorcycle, resulting in injuries to Mr. Thompson.
3.

R. at 2-3.

Mr. Thompson does not remember anything about the

accident.

He had, however, driven through that section of road

on many occasions ("thousands of times"), and had driven through
it twice within an hour of the accident.

Mr. Thompson was aware

that livestock could stray onto a road and constitute a hazard to
a motorcyclist.

He testified that he would look out for

livestock and, if he was apprehensive, would slow and perhaps
even stop.
4.

R. at 405-06 (citing Mr. Thompson's Depo. at 37-41).

The eye witness to the accident was also westbound on

SR-9 and was passed by the motorcycle.

As they approached the

accident scene, the Plaintiff was 75-100 yards ahead of the
witness.

The witness had no difficulty seeing the horse 100

yards away.

The horse was on the north side of the road and

appeared agitated.

The motorcycle never slowed.

3

The horse ran

out in front of the plaintiff's motorcycle and the collision
occurred.
5.

R. at 407 (citing Mr. McCaul's Depo. at 10-16.)
Mr. Thompson sued the horse owner, the persons charged

with corralling the horse, the State of Utah Department of
Transportation and the City of Hurricane.
6.

R. at 1-8.

Mr. Thompson alleged that Hurricane City had a duty of

care to erect and maintain signs along SR-9 warning drivers of
the hazards of driving in an area where domesticated animals run
at large.
7.

R. at 5.1
Mr. Thompson also alleged that Hurricane City had a

duty of care specifically "to Mr. Thompson to ensure that

1

Plaintiff abandoned this claim after discovery on liability
and after Hurricane City pointed out in its Motion for Summary
Judgment that the roadway on which the accident occurred was a
state highway over which the Utah State Department of
Transportation had jurisdiction. Plaintiff stated:
During the course of discovery, Plaintiff learned that,
although some horses had been loose in the general
vicinity of the accident and that although animals do
run at large within the municipal boundaries of
Hurricane City, the problem with estray animals in the
vicinity of the accident was not as extensive as first
supposed. Plaintiff therefore voluntarily moved to
dismiss the State of Utah from this action believing
that the State was not under a duty to place warning
signs for animals. Consistently, Plaintiff does not
intend to defend its allegation that the City of
Hurricane owed a duty to Plaintiff to maintain signs in
vicinity of the accident. Plaintiff does not object to
the Court's striking from the Complaint references to
Hurricane's duty to maintain signs near the accident
scene.
R. at 610-11.
4

domesticated animals did not run at large on or about the streets
of Hurricane City and SR-9."
8.

R. at 5.

Mr. Thompson alleged that the latter duty arose by

Hurricane City Ordinance, and that Hurricane City had a duty to
Mr. Thompson to enforce its Ordinances.

The City had ordinances

making it unlawful for domesticated animals to run at large
within the municipal boundaries of Hurricane City,2 and granting
2

Paragraph 3 of Appellant's Statement of Facts combines and
rearranges selective portions of two ordinances to come up with a
new meaning. Appellant states:
[U]nder the Ordinance, any "owner or person charged
with responsibility for an animal found running at
large" was strictly liable for "all damages incurred by
anyone whose person . . . ha[d] been injured" by the
loose animal "regardless of the precautions taken to
prevent the escape of the animal and regardless of
whether or not he kn[e]w that the animal [was] running
at large."
(Appellant's Brief, f 3, p. 2.)
The Ordinances instead read as follows:
2.
Animals Running at Large: It shall be unlawful
for the owner or custodian of any animal . . . to allow
such animals at any time to run at large. The owner or
person charged with responsibility for an animal found
running at large shall be strictly liable for a
violation of this section regardless of the precautions
taken to prevent the escape of the animal and
regardless of whether or not he knows that the animal
is running at large.
R. at 642 (§ 13-247(2)).
Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance .
. . shall be subject to the following:
(continued...)
5

authority to local officials to impound such animals and
otherwise enforce the ordinances.3 R. at 613, 635-52,
9.

On motion of Hurricane City, the District Court ordered

that discovery commence and be had on the issue of liability
only, so that defendants or some of them could file dispositive
motions, and those who were not liable as a matter of law would

2

(...continued)
3.
Restitution of the cost of all damages incurred by
anyone who's person, property or animal has been
injured or destroyed . . . .

R. at 651 (§ 13-257(3)).
Thus, the "strict liability" imposed by § 13-247(2) was for
criminal violation of the Ordinance, not for tort liability, and
the restitution identified in § 13-257(3) was a form of criminal
penalty or sanction, not tort liability.
Then, in Paragraph 4 of Appellant's Statement of Facts,
Appellant selectively uses only a portion of § 13-247(2) to reach
the conclusion that a municipal poundmaster somehow qualifies as
a person "charged with responsibility for an animal found running
at large . . . ." (Appellant's Brief, f 4, p. 3.) Read in full
context, however, that Ordinance imposes criminal liability for
owners and custodians of stray animals, and not tort liability on
the people who are responsible for enforcing the law and
impounding estray animals.
3

The Ordinance created an office of poundmaster, and at the
time of Mr. Thompson's accident the chief of police served as ex
officio poundmaster because no poundmaster had been appointed.
R. at 613, 635. The Ordinance also created a division of animal
control within the police department, appointed the chief of
police director, allowed the chief of police to receive the
assistance of any peace officer or animal control officer as he
may designate, and gave the director the charge to enforce animal
control ordinances and supervise animal control officers. R. at
613, 639.
6

not have to incur the expense of conducting discovery on damages.
R. at 201-02, 218-19, 223-24.
10.

Discovery revealed that Hurricane City first received

notice that a horse was loose at approximately 8:30 a.m. the day
of the accident.

At that time, an unknown motorist passing

through the drive-up window at the City offices told Virginia
Pectol, the City Clerk, that a horse was loose.4 The Clerk
attempted several times to contact the animal control officer
both by phone and radio, but was unsuccessful.
the accident occurred.
11.

In the meantime,

R. at 694-96.

Mrs. Pectol, in accordance with established procedure,

attempted to contact the animal control officer by calling the
Washington County Central Dispatch.

She called dispatch two or

three times, but the line was busy.

She also tried to contact

the animal control officer directly by radio and called him at
home, but there was no answer.

In between, she was attempting to

perform her usual functions in the City office.

Thus, it is

Appellant states: "It is reasonable to assume that other
people in Hurricane City did not remove Defendant Smart's loose
horse because they knew it had been reported to the Hurricane
City offices and Hurricane City police had an animal control
division that removed large, stray animals." Appellant's Brief,
p. 6 n.5. Such an assertion is the wildest of speculation.
There is no evidence whatsoever that other people knew the horse
was loose, or that it had been reported, or that others would
have removed the horse, or that others failed to take steps to
remove the horse because it had been reported. Even if such
evidence existed, however, it would not place upon Hurricane City
a duty to Mr. Thompson to control the conduct of third persons
under the "public duty" doctrine.
7

questionable whether her conduct was in any way unreasonable or
negligent, and it is speculative whether prompt contact with the
officer would have resulted in a different outcome.

For purposes

of the Summary Judgment Motion only, however, Hurricane City
assumed, arguendo, that Mrs. Pectol could have done more and that
it would have made a difference.
12.

R. at 404, 694-96.

The accident occurred at approximately 9:10 a.m., July

13, 1990. R. at 617.
13.

There is no evidence that the Thompsons had any

communication with the City or its agents about the horse before
the accident.

Mr. Thompson's actions prior to the accident were

not taken in reliance upon any conduct or representations by any
City officer or employee relating to the horse.
14.

R. at 404-05.

No evidence exists that the City had any notice that

Mr. Thompson himself would be in the vicinity of the horse, or
that the horse posed a particular threat to Mr. Thompson.

In

short, there was no notice to the City whatsoever to distinguish
Mr. Thompson from the public at large.
15.

See R. at 420.

On July 30, 1992, the District Court granted the City's

Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "the public duty
doctrine is applicable to the plaintiffs' claims against the City
of Hurricane and that no facts exist from which it could be found
than any special relationship existed between plaintiffs and the
defendant City of Hurricane."

The District Court certified the

8

Order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

R. at 788-89.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A negligence action may be maintained only if there is a
duty of care.

The existence of a duty is a question of law for

the court.
The "public duty" doctrine, which is well recognized in Utah
law, bars Mr. Thompson's negligence claim against Hurricane City.
The "public duty" doctrine provides that the governmental agency
has only a general duty to the public to enforce its laws, but
has no such duty to an individual member of the public absent a
showing of a "special relationship" between the agency and the
individual.

The government does not insure against conduct of

third persons.
Mr. Thompson cannot establish an exception to the "public
duty" doctrine based on a "special relationship" with Mr.
Thompson.

Under Utah law, Mr. Thompson would have to show (1)

inducement by the City and reliance by Mr. Thompson, or (2) that
the City had reason to distinguish him from the general public,
or (3) that he somehow had set himself apart from the general
public.

Mr. Thompson could not show any of the three.

Mr. Thompson tries to avoid application of the "public duty"
doctrine by arguing that Hurricane City's failure to impound the
third party's horse was a breach of a duty to maintain its

9

physical facilities (i.e., the State road).

However, the duty

associated with physical facilities is not here implicated;
rather, the necessity of controlling the conduct of third persons
is implicated.

A person has no duty to prevent another from

acting negligently absent a custodial relationship.

Nor does one

have a duty to protect another from the negligent or illegal acts
of a third person absent a "special relationship."
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

Under The "Public Duty" Doctrine. Hurricane City Owed
Mr. Thompson No Duty Of Care.
1.

A Duty Of Care Is An Essential Element Of
Plaintiff's Negligence Claim Against Hurricane
City.

A negligence action may be maintained only if there is a
duty or obligation, recognized by law, which requires the
defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order
to protect another against unreasonable risks of harm.

Lamarr v.

Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) ("Establishing the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
care is '[a]n essential element of a negligence claim1"); Reeves
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991) (elements of negligence
include "the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty"); Loveland v.
Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987) ("It is
axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a
duty").

10

As Dean Prosser explained, a "duty" in negligence cases is
defined as an obligation to which the law gives recognition and
effect to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward
another.

W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton On Torts §

53# 356 (5th ed. 1984).

An actor must bring himself within the

scope of a definite legal obligation so that it is regarded as
personal to him.
do."

"[N]egligence in the air, so to speak, will not

Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
2.

The Question Of The Existence Of A Duty Is Solely
For The Court.

The existence of a duty is a question to be decided by the
court.

E.g., Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d

535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care is 'entirely a question of law to be
determined by the court'") (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1989)).

This means that the court must decide:

Whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation
exists between the parties that the community will
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of
the other—or, more simply, whether the interest of the
plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to a
legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This
is entirely a question of law, to be determined by
reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles
and precedents which make up the law; it must be
determined only by the court.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 37, 206 (4th ed. 1971).

11

3.

The "Public Duty" Doctrine Bars Plaintiff's Claim
Of A Duty Of Care,

Appellant Thompson asks this Court to abandon or overturn a
long history of Utah law and recent Utah appellate court
decisions.

In a trilogy of recent cases, this Court and the Utah

Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence and parameters of the
"public duty" doctrine.

Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah

1989); Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989); Lamarr v.
Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The "public duty" doctrine provides that the governmental
agency has a general duty to enforce its laws, but has no such
duty to any individual member of the public absent a showing of a
"special relationship" between the agency and the individual.
The government agency does not insure against conduct of third
persons.

As this Court explained:

For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable
for negligently caused injuries suffered by a member of
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an
obligation owed to the general public at large by the
governmental official.
Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989)) .
The Ferree Court explained the policy for the "public duty"
doctrine in the context of a "custodial" case.

An inmate, on

release from a correction center, had committed murder and the

12

victim's family blamed corrections officials for not controlling
the conduct of a third-party inmate under their charge:
To adopt plaintiffs' theories would impose too broad a
duty of care on the part of corrections officers toward
individual members of the public. It would expose the
state to potentially every wrong that flows from the
necessary programs of rehabilitation and paroling of
prisoners. Given the increases in prison populations,
the effect could well be to burden corrections
officials and chill legitimate rehabilitative programs.
Parole and probation programs are subject to occasional
tragic failures because of the frailties of human
nature and the imprecision associated with predicting
violent human conduct, but they are also practically
indispensable. The public interest would not be served
by imposing liability on corrections officials and the
state for the uncertain success that attends parole and
probation programs. . . .
Ferguson and the victim were apparently unknown to each
other. In short, officials had no duty of due care to the
victim apart from their general duty to the public at large.
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
The Rollins Court confirmed that a state custodian of a
mental patient had no duty to protect any specific member of the
public from that patient, absent a showing of special relation
between the agency and the injured individual.

The Court

carefully analyzed the doctrine of "special relationship" as an
exception to the "public duty" doctrine and found that no such
relationship existed:
In Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah
1986), . . . we described as essentially pragmatic the
approach we would take in dealing with claims that
special relationships existed which gave rise to
consequent duties:

13

Determining whether one party has an
affirmative duty to protect another . . .
requires a careful consideration of the
consequences for the parties and society at
large. If the duty is realistically
incapable of performance, or if it is
fundamentally at odds with the nature of the
parties' relationship, we should be loath to
term that relationship "special" and to
impose a resulting "duty," for it is
meaningless to speak of "special
relationships" and "duties" in the abstract.
These terms are only labels which the legal
system applies to defined situations to
indicate that certain rights and obligations
flow from them; they are "an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection." . . . .
We concluded in Ferree that if the officials had reason
to believe that a detainee presented a danger to a
particular third person, a special relation, and hence
a duty, might be established apart from a generalized
duty to protect the public at large. However, we found
that no such showing had been made in Ferree.
Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989) (quoting Beach v.
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986)).
The Rollins Court concluded that because the injured person
was not reasonably identifiable to the hospital, or
distinguishable from the public at large, no "special
relationship" could arise and the hospital owed him no duty.

The

Court explained pragmatic policy reasons for its conclusion.
Absent a reason to believe that a third person under the
hospital's charge presented a danger to a particular person (as
distinguished from the public at large), imposing liability would
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have a crippling effect on custodial programs and would invoke
unlimited exposure, making them "virtual insurers" of third
parties1 conduct: "the duty [proposed] is realistically incapable
of performance [and] • . . it is fundamentally at odds with the
notions of the parties' relationship."

813 P.2d at 1161-62.

Finally, this Court addressed the "public duty" doctrine in
LamarrP the most recent of the trilogy, and the most closely
analogous to this case.

In Lamarr, the plaintiff was struck by a

car while he was walking east across the North Temple overpass.
Prior to the accident, he had walked west across the overpass
using a pedestrian walkway that ended under the overpass.

He was

frightened and harassed by transients who had congregated under
the overpass, so on the return trip, he walked along the roadway
where he was struck by a car.

Among other things, he claimed

that the city negligently failed to take affirmative steps to
"control" the conduct of third parties—the transient population
under the overpass.

The District Court granted the city's motion

for summary judgment, holding that the city owed Lamarr no
private or personalized duty to "control" the transient
population and that the city's conduct was otherwise an immune
discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a).
Relying heavily on Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989) and Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989), this
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Court affirmed the order of summary judgment.

The Court

explained:
The public duty doctrine has been defined as "a duty to
all is a duty to none." Thus, if the City owed no duty
to Lamarr apart from its duty to the general public,
Lamarr cannot recover.
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the
parameters of Utah's public duty Doctrine. In Ferree,
the court applied the public duty doctrine holding
state corrections officials were not liable when a
prison inmate on weekend release murdered Dean Ferree.
The court concluded the officials had only a general
duty to the public, not a private duty to Ferree, and
therefore owed Ferree no duty of care. Moreover, in
Rollins, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment because under the public duty
doctrine, the State did not owe a duty to protect the
decedent from a state hospital patient. The court
specifically noted the decedent "was simply a member of
the public, no more distinguishable to the hospital
than to any other person."
828 P.2d at 539 (some citations omitted).5
Examining the facts before it in light of Ferree and
Rollins, the Lamarr Court stated:
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr must establish
the City owed him a "special duty." We conclude Lamarr
5

Lamarr contended that the "public duty" doctrine was
abrogated by legislative waiver of certain immunities under the
Governmental Immunity Act. This Court, and the Utah Supreme
Court, have rejected that argument. The Lamarr Court explained
that the "public duty" doctrine is a creature of common law and
addresses the issue of the existence of a government agency's
duty in the first instance. (The Governmental Immunity Act
addresses a conceptually different issue.) Unless a defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, liability cannot attach.
If liability cannot attach, there is no need to reach the issue
of immunity. Therefore, the Governmental Immunity Act left the
"public duty doctrine" undisturbed. 828 P.2d at 539 and n.4
(citing Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53).
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has failed to establish the City owed him any duty of
care beyond that owed the general public. There is no
evidence in the record the City had any reason to
distinguish Lamarr from the general pubic. Like the
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set himself apart"
from the general public such that any special duty
arose between himself and the City. In fact, there is
no evidence the City had any knowledge whatsoever of
either of Lamarr's trips across the overpass.
Id. at 540.
To emphasize that liability will not attach absent the
existence of a special duty to the individual (as distinguished
from the general duty to the public), the Lamarr Court contrasted
the facts before it with a case in which a special duty had been
found to exist.

The Court stated:

This conclusion is also supported by the [S]upreme
[C]ourt's decision in Little v. Utah State Division of
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In that
case, the court held that once a State agency took
custody of an autistic child and placed the child in a
foster home, the agency assumed a duty of due care to
the child. Id. at 51. It was only after the agency
had knowledge of the child's condition and assumed
custody of the child, however, that the special
relationship arose between the agency and the child.
Id.
Id. at 540 n.5.
Similarly, in Stout v. City of Porterville. 148 Cal. App. 3d
937, 296 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1983), quoted in Christenson v. Hayward,
694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), the court explained circumstances
whereby a special relationship could arise:
The only additional duty undertaken by accepting
employment as a police officer is the duty owed to the
public at large. . . .
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Appellants did not allege that [the officer] assured
Michael Stout he would take care of him or by his words
or conduct induced him to rely on the officer's
protection. Appellants did not allege that the officer
in any way induced him into a false sense of security.
In sum, appellants failed to allege a common law legal
duty owed to them by the City and/or [the officer].
Numerous additional cases and authorities hold that under
facts similar to those herein, the policy reasons underlying the
"public duty" doctrine bar a plaintiff's claims against a
government agency.

The government is not to be the scapegoat,

nor an insurer against a third-party's conduct.6
6

0wens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) (County owed
no duty to child injured by babysitter who was under
investigation for abuse); Christenson v. Havward, 694 P.2d 612
(Utah 1984) (statutory duties to "preserve the peace" and "make
all lawful arrests" are owed to public and not to particular
individuals; officers not liable for failure to arrest
intoxicated motorcyclist who was later killed); White v. State of
Utah, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah 1978) (State's failure properly to
inspect under OSHA would not create liability; "The legislature .
. . had no intention of making [the State] the scapegoat for
every industrial accident"); Obrey v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17,
484 P.2d 160 (1971) (sheriff's failure to investigate burglary
not actionable); Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla.
1985) (city was immune from liability for failing to impound
dangerous dog that was running at large: "The judicial branch
should not trespass into the decisional process of [the executive
function in enforcing laws]"); Christopher v. Bavnton, 141 Mich.
App. 309, 367 N.W.2d 378 (1985) (failure to enforce dog ordinance
not actionable); Maxwell v. Audoban Park Comm'n for the City of
New Orleans, 482 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 1986) (failure to enforce
leash ordinance and reduce stray dog problem not actionable in
claim where plaintiff's bicycle collided with dog); Lundaren v.
City of McCall, 817 P.2d 1080 (Idaho 1991) (city owed no duty to
protect individual plaintiff from illegal fireworks being set off
by celebrants, despite fact that officers knew of fireworks and
failed to enforce fireworks ordinance); see also 63 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations § 752 ("A municipality is not liable for
the mere failure to prevent an act or condition which, in the
(continued...)
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4.

No Special Duty To Mr. Thompson Existed.

Citing cases from other jurisdictions (Colorado, California,
Pennsylvania, Alaska, New York, Kansas), Plaintiff contends that
a special relationship arose because the City took some action to
notify authorities of the stray horse and thereby "assumed" a
duty (where one did not exist before) .7 However, under Utah law,
this is not sufficient to establish a special relationship where
the Plaintiff was not induced by the City's conduct, in no way
relied on the City's conduct, and otherwise did not distinguish
himself from the general public.

Plaintiff's argument reaches

the ironic conclusion that had the City simply ignored altogether
any complaint about the stray horse, the City would have had no
duty.

(...continued)
exercise of its police power or government functions it might
have prevented, as in the case of failure to enact or enforce
ordinances"); E. McQuillin, 18 The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 53.80 (3d ed. and Supp. 1992) ("it is not liable for failure of
policemen to perform their duty to protect private persons or
property against a known violation of law. So it is not liable
for the negligence of policemen in failing . . . to prevent
cattle running at large about the city or town"); cases cited at
Annot., Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit For
Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46 A.L.R. 3d (1972 and
Supp. 1992); cases cited at Annot., Failure to Restrain Drunk
Driver as Ground of Liability of State or Local Government Unit
or Officer, 48 A.L.R. 4th 320 (1986 and Supp. 1992).
7

The City's conduct, however, never made it to the
"assumption" stage because no effort was actually made to locate
or impound the horse.
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Appellant cannot establish an exception to the "public duty"
doctrine based on a special duty to Mr. Thompson.

Utah case law

has clearly identified the circumstances by which the special
duty exception arises. Mr. Thompson would have to show (1)
inducement by the City and reliance by Mr. Thompson, (2) that the
City had reason to distinguish him from the general public, or
(3) that he somehow had set himself apart from the general
public.

Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Rollins v.

Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1989); Lamarr v. Utah State Dept.
of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Christenson v.
Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Little v. Utah State Division
of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).
Mr. Thompson was simply a member of the public, no more
distinguishable to the City than any other person.

No evidence

exists that the City had any reason to distinguish Mr. Thompson
from the general public, or that he had somehow set himself apart
from the general public.

Specifically, the City had no notice

that Mr. Thompson personally would be in the vicinity of the
horse, and had no notice that the horse posed any threat to Mr.
Thompson.

Mr. Thompson did not communicate with the City

concerning the horse; and, Mr. Thompson took no action in
reliance upon any specific City action or any City representation
of the horse's whereabouts or propensities.

The City had no

basis to distinguish Mr. Thompson from the public at large.
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The

City's failure to remedy a condition created by third parties,
(such as harassment by transients or a grazing horse along a
State highway) does not create a duty specific to an individual.
The duty is to the public and not to individuals.
Moreover, Mr. Thompson's proposed duty is "realistically
incapable of performance [and] . . . it is fundamentally at odds
with the notions of the parties' relationship."

Appellant's

theory "would impose too broad a duty of care" on cities and
towns in this State simply by virtue of their animal control
ordinances.

It would require that government agencies accurately

predict human and animal conduct not under their control. Rural
cities and towns would become the virtual insurers of every foot
of the miles of stock pens, corrals and fences enclosing
livestock located within city limits.

It would presumably

require the cities to maintain such fences to prevent the escape
of any animal, even non-dangerous animals like the horse in this
case, or dogs, cats, chickens, etc., any of which could cause a
motorcycle accident, without any notice that the animal posed a
risk to any particular person.
5.

Mr. Thompson Was Not Within A Group Identifiable
From The General Public.

Plaintiff also tries to establish a "special relationship"
by claiming that although the City had no reason to distinguish
Mr. Thompson himself from the general public, he fell within an
"identifiable group."

Plaintiff misapplies the concept.
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This

notion arose in the Rollins case, which involved a custodial
relationship between a mental hospital and a patient.

The mental

patient had stolen a car and caused an accident which resulted in
another1s death, and the Court was faced with defining the added
duties arising out of the custodial relationship in light of the
"public duty" doctrine.
The Court explained:
Before any duty is imposed to protect others from
bodily harm caused by one under control of the state,
the "others" to whom such bodily harm is "likely" and
in favor of whom the duty arises must be reasonably
identifiable by the custodian either individually or as
members of a distinct group. Generally, for a person
or group to be reasonably identifiable, the bodily harm
caused will be of the type that the custodian knew or
should have known the detainee was likely to cause if
not controlled. And here we emphasize that the term is
"likely" to cause, not "might" cause.
813 P.2d 1156, 1162.

In other words, (1) a "custodian"—someone

who has responsibility for another—may have a duty to protect a
third person from the person under custody if (2) the third
person is reasonably identifiable individually or as a member of
a "distinct group" and (3) the harm is "likely" to occur—the
"detainee" was "likely" to cause that specific harm if not
controlled.

The Rollins Court concluded that the accident victim

was not reasonably identifiable to the custodian either
individually or as a member of a distinct group.
In this case, the City did not own the horse and was not
responsible for corralling the horse.
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There was no custodial

relationship between the City and the horse which would impose
the added burden on the City to identify Mr. Thompson as a member
of a "distinct group" that would "likely" incur harm.

That is

the only relationship out of which this type of duty could arise.
Moreover, even if the "custodial" standard were to apply in
this case, Mr. Thompson was no more identifiable to the City as
an individual or as a member of a distinct group than was Mr.
Lamarr, who was struck by a car while trying to avoid harassment
by transients.

Any general member of the public could have been

using the roadways at issue or could have been injured in some
other way by the horse.

Again, as the Lamarr Court explained:

Lamarr has failed to establish the City owed him any
duty of care beyond that owed the general public.
There is no evidence in the record the City had any
reason to distinguish Lamarr from the general public.
Like the decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set
himself apart" from the general public such that any
special duty arose between himself and the City. In
fact, there is no evidence the City had any knowledge
whatsoever of either of Lamarr's trips across the
overpass.
828 P.2d at 540.
B.

Hurricane City's Duty To Maintain Its Physical
Facilities Is Not Implicated By The Facts.

Appellant Thompson tries to avoid application of the "public
duty doctrine" by arguing that Hurricane City's failure to
impound the third party's horse was a breach of some duty to
maintain its physical facilities.

Plaintiff cites three cases in

support of this argument; each, however, involved the failure to
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maintain actual physical facilities (i.e., city streets or
sidewalks) rather than the control of less predictable thirdparty conduct.

The facts of this case are easily distinguished

from those circumstances, and strong policy reasons militate
against extending such a duty to the present situation.
In Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the
City had conducted road maintenance but had failed to inspect
signs where the work had been done.
which resulted in an accident.

A stop sign was missing

In Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733

P.2d 126 (Utah 1987), Ingram was injured when he stepped on a
defective manhole cover located in an area where the City had
undertaken a beautification program.

In Trapp v. Salt Lake City.

190 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah July 7, 1992), a case involving a
defective city sidewalk, the Court drew the distinction between
maintenance of a physical facility and control of third persons.
The Court explained:
Salt Lake City argues, that it has no duty because it
had no special relationship to Trapp. . . . These
special relationship cases, however, have no
application to the present case. They address whether
and under what circumstances one party owes another
party a duty to protect that party from his or her own
acts or from the acts of a third party. In the special
relationship cases, people, not physical facilities,
are the things that must be "controlled" if the duty
exists. Because people are inherently less
controllable than physical things, the common law has
imposed no duty to control the conduct of others except
in certain circumstances, as where a special
relationship exists. . . . The present case does not
involve the duty to control an independent actor;
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rather, it involves a duty to maintain physical
facilities. . . •
This duty seems generally grounded in the common law
principle that one who has control over a physical
facility has an obligation to keep it in a safe
condition.
Id. at 28-29.
Hurricane City does not quarrel with the proposition that it
has a duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks.

However, the

City should not have a legal duty to prevent someone else from
acting negligently.

It has no duty to protect one from the

negligent or illegal acts of another absent a special
relationship.8

The City's only duty in that context is to the

general public under the "public duty11 doctrine.

°See Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977) (no duty to
foresee criminal acts of third party); Owens v. Garfield, 784
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) (no duty to control conduct of third person
absent special custodial relationship); Davis v. Manaelsdorf, 138
Ariz. 207, 673 P.2d 951 (Ariz App. 1983) (no duty to control
conduct of third person absent special custodial relationship);
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988) (no duty to protect
another from harm absent special relationship), cert, denied, 490
U.S. 1007 (1989); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (no
duty to prevent third party from harming another absent special
custodial relationship); Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792
P.2d 36 (1990) (for duty to arise, plaintiff must show that
relationship existed by which defendant was legally obligated to
protect interest of plaintiff); Torres v. United States Nat'l
Bank of Oregon, 65 Or. App. 207, 670 P.2d 230 (an individual is
under no duty to protect another from the wrongful acts of a
third party, and may reasonably proceed on the assumption that
others will obey the law), rev, denied, 296 Or. 237, 675 P.2d 491
(1983); Cox v. Malcolm, 60 Wash. App. 894, 808 P.2d 758 (no duty
to prevent third party from causing physical injury to another),
rev, denied, 117 Wash. 1014, 816 P.2d 1224 (1991).
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Imposing a duty on the City in this circumstance would go
well beyond the standards of the law of negligence and
reasonableness and would not be in the interests of justice or
public policy.

As discussed above, such a standard "would impose

too broad a duty of care" on cities and towns in this State
simply by virtue of their animal control ordinances.

Rural

cities and towns would become the virtual insurers of what occurs
on its streets, even though caused by the acts or neglect of
third parties over whom the City has no control.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Unless cities are to become the insurers of the negligent
conduct of their citizens, the Order of the District Court
granting Hurricane City summary judgment should be affirmed.
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